BitML^x

Cross-chain Smart Contracts for Bitcoin-style Cryptocurrencies

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FCS 2023 July 9, 2023 • Smart contracts: programs running on blockchains, moving cryptocurrencies.

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- Bitcoin-style cryptocurrencies have limited scripting capabilities.
- BitML: high-level language for contracts on Bitcoin.
- BitML^x: cross-blockchain, synchronous, BitML.



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 $\{A : !1\ddot{B} \mid A : \text{ secret } a\}Swap^{\ddot{B}}$ $\{B : !1\ddot{D} \mid B : \text{ secret } b\}Swap^{\ddot{D}}$

Federico Badaloni (MPI-SP)



$$Swap^{B} = Exchange^{B} + Refund^{B}$$



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$$Exchange^{B} = reveal a$$
. withdraw B



$$Swap^{B} = Exchange^{B} + Refund^{B}$$

$$Exchange^{B} = reveal a$$
.withdraw B

$$Refund^{\ddot{B}} = after t : withdraw A$$



$$Swap^{B} = Exchange^{B} + Refund^{B}$$

$$Exchange^{B} = reveal a$$
. withdraw B

$$Refund^{B} = after t : withdraw A$$

$$Swap^{\Box} = reveal \ b$$
 . withdraw A
+ after t : withdraw B



Alice

• Here is **a**.



Bob

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Alice

• Here is **a**.

Bob • Thanks!



Alice

- Here is **a**.
- Can I have b now?

Bob • Thanks!



Alice

- Here is **a**.
- Can I have **b** now?

Bob • Thanks!

...



Alice

- Here is **a**.
- Can I have b now?
- Hello?

Bob

Thanks!



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Read the bibliography on sound cryptographic protocol designs.

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 $\{A : !(1\overset{B}{\bowtie}, 0\overset{D}{\circlearrowright}) \mid B : !(0\overset{B}{\bowtie}, 1\overset{D}{\circlearrowright})\}Swap^{\times}$

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 $\{A : !(1B, 0D) \mid B : !(0B, 1D)\} Swap^{\times}$ Swap[×] = Exchange[×] +> Refund[×]

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 $\begin{array}{l} \textit{Exchange}^{\times} &= \texttt{withdraw}(\\ (0\ddot{B},1\ddot{D}) \rightarrow \textit{A},\\ (1\ddot{B},0\ddot{D}) \rightarrow \textit{B} \\) \end{array}$

Read the bibliography on sound cryptographic protocol designs. Or let $BitML^{\times}$ do it for them!

 $\{A : !(1B, 0D) \mid B : !(0B, 1D)\} Swap^{\times}$ Swap[×] = Exchange[×] +> Refund[×]



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$$Swap^{\times} \xrightarrow{???} \begin{cases} \vec{T}_{\scriptscriptstyle B}^{\times} \\ \vec{T}_{\scriptscriptstyle D}^{\times} \end{cases}$$

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$$\begin{array}{ccc} Swap^{\ddot{\mathbb{B}}} & \xrightarrow{\operatorname{BitML compiler}} & \vec{\mathcal{T}}_{\scriptscriptstyle{\mathbb{B}}} \\ Swap^{\ddot{\mathbb{D}}} & \xrightarrow{\operatorname{BitML compiler}} & \vec{\mathcal{T}}_{\scriptscriptstyle{\mathbb{D}}} \end{array}$$

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$$\begin{array}{c} Swap^{\begin{tabular}{ll} \hline B} & \xrightarrow{\text{BitML compiler}} & \vec{\mathcal{T}}_{B} \\ Swap^{\begin{tabular}{ll} \hline D} & \xrightarrow{\text{BitML compiler}} & \vec{\mathcal{T}}_{D} \end{array}$$

$$Swap^{\times} \xrightarrow{\text{BitML}^{\times} \text{ compiler}} \begin{cases} Swap_{\mathbb{B}}^{\times} \\ Swap_{\mathbb{D}}^{\times} \end{cases}$$

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• Synchronicity: every time a choice is taken on one side, it's replicated on the other.

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 $C_1 \Rightarrow C_2 \Rightarrow C_3 \Rightarrow \dots$

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• Fairness: malicious users cannot harm honest users.

{ *A* :!1^B | *A* : secret *a* | *B* : secret *b* }*Swap*^X_B { *B* :!10 | *A*: secret *a* | *B*: secret *b* }*Swap*[×]

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{ *B* :!10 | *A*: secret *a* | *B*: secret *b* }*Swap*





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 $t_0 < t_1$



{ *B* :!10 | *A*: secret *a* | *B*: secret *b* }*Swap*





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 $t_0 < t_1$









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 $t_0 < t_1$









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Image: A matrix and a matrix

 $\{ A : | 1 | B \\ | A : \text{secret } a \\ | B : \text{secret } b \\ \} Swap_B^{\times}$



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 $\{ A : | 1 | B \\ | A : \text{secret } a \\ | B : \text{secret } b \\ \} Swap_B^{\times}$



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• How can we "punish" asynchronous behavior?

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- Make them pay! But, how much?
- Everyone locks in an extra collateral deposit c:

$$c = b \times (n-2)$$

where b is the contract balance, an n is the number of participants.

Theorem (Compiler correctness, informal)

Each strategy of an honest user A on a Bit ML^{\times} contract C translates into a strategy on the concurrently executing compiled BitML contracts $C_{\underline{B}} \mid C_{\underline{D}}$ that allows A to extract at least as many assets from $C_{\underline{B}} \mid C_{\underline{D}}$ as from C with the original strategy.

Thanks!

- BitML[×] allows you to model cross-blockchain smart contracts.
- It's compiled to concurrently executing BitML contracts.
- Security by mechanisms of timed commitments and punishments
- Work in Progress:
 - Proving BitML[×] correctness.
 - Implementing compiler in Haskell.

Download short paper, slides and (soon) compiler:



Federico Badaloni (MPI-SP)